According to a post-war account by Karl Strölin, the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart at that time, he and two other conspirators, Alexander von Falkenhausen and Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel, began efforts to bring Rommel into the anti-Hitler conspiracy in early 1944. [149] On 15 April 1944, Rommel's new chief of staff, Hans Speidel, arrived in Normandy and reintroduced Rommel to Stülpnagel. [150] Speidel had previously been connected to Carl Goerdeler, the civilian leader of the resistance, but not to the plotters led by Stauffenberg, and only came to the attention of Stauffenberg due to his appointment to Rommel's headquarters. The conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty, and gave instructions to Speidel to bring Rommel into their circle. [151] Rommel had wrongly predicted that the collapse of the German line in Italy would be fast. On 21 November, Hitler gave Kesselring overall command of the Italian theatre, moving Rommel and Army Group B to Normandy in France with responsibility for defending the French coast against the long anticipated Allied invasion. [215] Atlantic Wall 1944 [ edit ] Rommel observes the fall of shot at Riva-Bella, just north of Caen in the area that would become Sword Beach in Normandy. Building the Atlantic Wall was officially the responsibility of the Organisation Todt, [447] which was not under Rommel's command, but he enthusiastically joined the task, [448] [449] protesting slave labour and suggesting that they should recruit French civilians and pay them good wages. [450] Despite this, French civilians and Italian prisoners of war held by the Germans were forced by officials under the Vichy government, [451] the Todt Organization and the SS forces [452] [453] to work on building some of the defences Rommel requested, in appalling conditions according to historian Will Fowler. Although they got basic wages, the workers complained because it was too little and there was no heavy equipment. [451] [454] [455] [456] [ excessive citations] Hearing of Rommel's reputation as an outstanding military instructor, in February 1937 Hitler assigned him as the War Ministry liaison officer to the Hitler Youth in charge of military training. Here he clashed with Baldur von Schirach, the Hitler Youth leader, over the training that the boys should receive. [43] Trying to fulfill a mission assigned to him by the Ministry of War, [44] Rommel had twice proposed a plan that would have effectively subordinated Hitler Youth to the army, removing it from NSDAP control. That went against Schirach's express wishes. Schirach appealed directly to Hitler; consequently, Rommel was quietly removed from the project in 1938. [45] He had been promoted to Oberst (colonel), on 1 August 1937, and in 1938, following the Anschluss, he was appointed commandant of the Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt. [46]

Rommel, 1944 The Forced Suicide of Field Marshall Rommel, 1944

While certainly much less proficient than Rommel in their leadership, aggressiveness, tactical outlook and mobile warfare skills, [365] Italian commanders were competent in logistics, strategy and artillery doctrine: their troops were ill-equipped but well-trained. As such, the Italian commanders were repeatedly at odds with Rommel over concerns with issues of supply. [366] Field Marshal Kesselring was assigned Supreme Commander Mediterranean, at least in part to alleviate command problems between Rommel and the Italians. This effort resulted only in partial success, with Kesselring's own relationship with the Italians being unsteady and Kesselring claiming Rommel ignored him as readily as he ignored the Italians. [367] [368] Rommel often went directly to Hitler with his needs and concerns, taking advantage of the favouritism that the Führer displayed towards him and adding to the distrust that Kesselring and the German High Command already had of him. [369] The Cairns Post (9 September 1941). "Gangster goes to war? Hitler's "white hope" ". The Cairns Post . Retrieved 14 September 2017. On 15 April 1944, Rommel's new chief of staff, Hans Speidel, arrived in Normandy and reintroduced Rommel to Stülpnagel. [256] Speidel had previously been connected to Carl Goerdeler, the civilian leader of the resistance, but not to the plotters led by Claus von Stauffenberg, and came to Stauffenberg's attention only upon his appointment to Rommel's headquarters. The conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty. Erwin von Witzleben, who would have become commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht had the plot succeeded, was a field marshal, but had been inactive since 1942. The conspirators gave instructions to Speidel to bring Rommel into their circle. [257] Speidel met with former foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath and Strölin on 27 May in Germany, ostensibly at Rommel's request, although the latter was not present. Neurath and Strölin suggested opening immediate surrender negotiations in the West, and, according to Speidel, Rommel agreed to further discussions and preparations. [241] Around the same timeframe, the plotters in Berlin were not aware that Rommel had allegedly decided to take part in the conspiracy. On 16 May, they informed Allen Dulles, through whom they hoped to negotiate with the Western Allies, that Rommel could not be counted on for support. [258]Historian Thomas Vogel opines that Rommel was not a Nazi, if one uses the definition the Nazis themselves used, considering that although he did everything in his power to make his country strong again, he showed no support towards the racial policies or other aspects of the regime. [118] [119] Operational and strategic level commander [ edit ] Murray, Williamson (1995). "Knight's Cross, A Life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel by David Fraser". The Journal of Military History. Virginia Military Institute and the George C. Marshall Foundation. 59 (2): 345–346. doi: 10.2307/2944594. ISSN 1543-7795. JSTOR 2944594. Calder, Angus (2012). The People's War: Britain 1939–1945. Random House. pp.242, 265, 304, 524, 564. ISBN 978-1-4481-0310-2. Reuth, based on Jodl's testimony, reports that Rommel forcefully presented the situation and asked for political solutions from Hitler, who rebuffed that Rommel should leave politics to him. [274] Brighton comments that Rommel seemed devoted, even though he did not have much faith in Hitler anymore considering he kept informing Hitler in person and by letter about his changing beliefs despite facing a military dilemma as well as a personal struggle. [275] Lieb remarks that Rommel's attitude in describing the situation honestly and requiring political solutions was almost without precedent and contrary to the attitude of many other generals. [276] [262] Remy comments that Rommel put himself and his family (which he had briefly considered evacuating to France, but refrained from doing so) at risk for the resistance out of a combination of his concern for the fate of Germany, his indignation at atrocities and the influence of people around him. [277] The trend continued with other uncritical biographies, such as Rommel as Military Commander (1968), by the former British soldier and author Ronald Lewin, and Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1994), by the former British general David Fraser. [74] [75] These works focused on Rommel's military career, depoliticising it and presenting him strictly as a soldier. [76]

Killing Rommel: An action-packed, tense and thrilling wartime

Der Mann wusste, dass der Krieg verloren ist". Frankfurter Allgemeine (in German). 3 November 2012 . Retrieved 15 June 2016. According to Reuth, the reason Lucie Rommel did not want her husband to be associated with any conspiracy was that even after the war, the German population neither grasped nor wanted to comprehend the reality of the genocide, thus conspirators were still treated as traitors and outcasts. [270] On the other hand, the resistance depended on the reputation of Rommel to win over the population. [271] [272] Some officers who had worked with Rommel also recognised the relationship between Rommel and the resistance: Westphal said that Rommel did not want any more senseless sacrifices. [271] Butler, using Ruge's recollections, reports that when told by Hitler himself that "no one will make peace with me", Rommel told Hitler that if he was the obstacle for peace, he should resign or kill himself, but Hitler insisted on fanatical defence. [273] In North Africa Rommel received help in cultivating his image from Alfred Ingemar Berndt, a senior official at the Reich Propaganda Ministry, who had volunteered for military service. [20] Seconded by Goebbels, Berndt was assigned to Rommel's staff and became one of his closest aides. Berndt often acted as liaison between Rommel, the Propaganda Ministry and the Führer Headquarters. He directed Rommel's photo shoots and filed radio dispatches describing the battles. [21] [22]In France, a Wehrmacht propaganda company frequently accompanied Rommel on his inspection trips to document his work for both domestic and foreign audiences. [43] [44] In May 1944, the German newsreels reported on Rommel's speech at a Wehrmacht conference, where he stated his conviction that "every single German soldier will make his contribution against the Anglo-American spirit that it deserves for its criminal and bestial air war campaign against our homeland." The speech led to an upswing in morale and sustained confidence in Rommel. [45] Von Fleischhauer, Jan; Friedmann, Jan (29 October 2012). "Die Kraft des Bösen". Der Spiegel. Vol.44. Archived from the original on 11 December 2016 . Retrieved 30 May 2016.